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Abstract 
This paper estimates the incidence of corporate taxes in an emerging economy –India- using the 
data from 5,666 business firms listed in the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and the National Stock 
Exchange of India (NSE) for the period 2000-15. Using the dynamic panel models, we find that 
capital bear the burden of corporate taxation relatively more than the labour. Our findings highlight 
that the burden of corporate tax is more on capital than labour. It is also found that the effective 
tax rate is higher for the small corporate firms than the gigantic firms. Further research is required 
to understand whether less incidence of corporate taxation on wages in India is due to profit 
shifting. 
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1. Introduction 
The corporate tax incidence has significant policy implications for the progressivity of the tax 
system. The International Monetary Fund (2019) in their policy paper “Corporate Taxation in the 
Global Economy” has highlighted the macro-criticality of the corporate tax incidence, its cross-
country spillovers and the vulnerability due to base erosion and profit shifting activities (BEPS). 
In an open economy, higher corporate taxes lead to lower capital formation so that labour 
productivity and wages decline, shifting the tax burden to workers (Harberger, 1962). However, 
empirical evidence is inconclusive whether the incidence of corporate tax falls on capital or labour 
or is shared between capital and labour.  
 
Fuest , Peichl and Seigloch (2017) highlights that the cross-country studies on corporate tax 
incidence (such as Hassett and Mathur, 2006; Felix, 2007; Desai, Foley and Hines, 2007; Clausing, 
2013; Azemar and Hubbard, 2015) failed to defend their assumptions on common trend, while 
single-country design studies ( such as Dwenger, Rattenhuber and Steiner, 2011; Arulampalam, 
Devereux and Maffini, 2012; Liu and Altshuler, 2013) have ignored the firm specific variables to 
explain the variation in corporate tax incidence. Our paper contributes to the single-country design 
literature, by focusing on India, incorporating the firm specific dimensions of the corporate sector.  
 
Unlike the recent single-country studies by Fuest, Peichl and Seigloch (2017) in the context of 
Germany, and Serrato and Zidar (2016) in USA, which capture the “within country variations” 
through statutory municipal taxes and the State-level corporate taxes using spatial equilibrium 
frameworks, we focus on federal corporate tax incidence at the firm level in the context of India. 
The unit of analysis is not subnational entities in our study because in India the corporate tax is 
federal and there is no variation in corporate tax across States or municipalities. We bring 
heterogeneity in the models by incorporating the variables relate to firm level behaviour. 
 
Our paper uses data from 5,666 corporate firms in India (listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange 
[BSE] and the National Stock Exchange of India [NSE]) from 2000–2015 and analyzes the impact 
of corporate tax on the capital and labor employed by corporations.  
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2. Theoretical and Empirical Review of the Literature 
The empirical research on the corporate incidence are mainly twofold in design: a set of cross-
country analysis of effects of taxation on capital and labour mobility from high-tax countries to 
low-tax countries; and another set of single-country research design of the intertemporal effects of 
business taxation burden on capital and labour, taking into consideration the “within” effects, either 
at firm level or at subnational government levels. Our study belongs to the latter category of single-
country effects of taxation across time and captured with the business firms as the unit of analysis.   
 
  Fuest, Peichl and Seigloch (2017), one of the recent single-country research design studies, has 
estimated the tax incidence for heterogeneous labour categories to analyse whether higher 
corporate taxes reduce wages most for the low-skilled, women, and young workers. They found 
that the average pass-through on wages was of the extent 51%. They found that corporate tax was 
progressive in Germany. Piketty and Saez (2007) also analysed the progressivity of corporate 
taxation in the context of USA.  However, these studies mentioned that the impact of firm level 
determinants are beyond the scope of their analysis, due to the complications in data. Our paper 
analyses the corporate tax incidence incorporating the firm level determinants.  
 
Auerbach (2005) reviews “what we know from economic theory and evidence about corporate tax 
incidence” and highlights that one-dimensional incidence analysis across labour categories can be 
relatively uninformative as it misses the element timing, and he flagged that it is more meaningful 
to analyse the tax incidence relates to the path of economy over time. In a seminal paper, Harberger 
(1962) analyses the corporate tax incidence within a closed economy with two sectors - corporate 
and non-corporate, where capital bears the burden of business taxation. However, in an open 
economy, higher corporate taxes decrease capital investment, and thereby labour productivity and 
wages (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Bradford 1978 and Kotlikoff and Summers 1987, Amiti and 
Davis, 2010). In a cross-country design, the corporate capital moves from high-tax countries to 
low-tax ones, reducing the capital-labor ratio in the former and leading to a lower marginal product 
of labor and lower wages. At the same time, low-tax countries experience higher capital-labor 
ratios, a higher marginal product of labor, and hence higher wages (Auerbach, 2006 and Gravelle, 
2013). 
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Randolph (2006) conducts a study in USA on the basis of Harberger’s model. Assuming an open 
economy, the paper asserts that domestic owners shift much of the burden of the corporate tax onto 
capital owners abroad. Using data from 65 countries over 25 years, Hassett and Mathur (2006) 
focus on the long-term impact of higher corporate taxes on wages. The paper finds that higher 
taxes depress wages. Moreover, the findings suggest that not only domestic but international tax 
rates also affect domestic wages. This significant relationship between corporate taxes and wages 
is tested using the fixed effects technique. Felix (2007) tests the relationship between taxes and the 
burden on capital and labor. Using data for 19 countries from 1979–2002, the paper finds that a 
one percent higher corporate tax leads to 0.7 percent lower wages after controlling for observable 
worker characteristics. The paper concludes that as the capital tax rate increases, the burden falls 
both on labor and capital, with labor bearing slightly more than half of this burden. Arulampalam, 
Devereux, and Maffini (2007) use company-level European data to estimate the wage effects of 
tax burdens that differ between firms. The results show that firms with greater tax obligations pay 
lower wages. Also the estimates imply that labor bears close to 100 percent of the corporate tax 
burden in the long run. 
 
Desai, Foley, and Hines (2007) estimate wage and interest rate sensitivity to corporate tax rates for 
a four-year sample of US multinational firm affiliates in OECD countries in the years 1989, 1994, 
1999, and 2004. Finding the relative burden of the corporate tax, they constrain the total burden 
shares to one using the seemingly unrelated regression technique. They find that labor bears 
between 45 percent and 75 percent of the total burden. Clausing (2012) compares OECD countries 
to find the effect of corporate taxes on wages. Contrary to the previous empirical literature, the 
paper finds no evidence of linkages between corporate taxes and wages. A thorough review of the 
theoretical literature, showing a probable link between the two, is in contrast with the empirics of 
the paper, which reveals no links between corporate taxes and wages.  
 
Carroll (2009) uses cross-sectional state-level data from 1970–2007 to investigate the relationship 
between corporate taxes and wages at the state level while controlling for both state and time 
effects. The paper finds a significant relationship between the two and concludes that a 1 percent 
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increase in the average state and local corporate tax rate can lower real wages by 0.014 percent. 
One of the few papers in the Indian context is by Shome (1978), which explores the effect of a 
marginal change in the corporate tax on wages in the economy. In a general equilibrium setting, 
the incidence of corporate tax is tested for the period 1971–72. The findings suggest that a part of 
the burden of corporate taxes are shifted to laborers and that there is a need to alter the tax base, 
as the purpose of the corporate tax is in fact to tax capital income and not labor. We take the 
literature forward by incorporating the firm level specificities in a single country design, and 
capture the incidence of corporate taxation over time.  
 
3. Interpreting Data 
The period of analysis is 2000-2015 and includes 5,666 Indian corporate (Bombay Stock Exchange 
[BSE] and the National Stock Exchange of India [NSE] listed) firms. The source of the data is the 
Prowess IQ database provided by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). The tax 
rates and budgetary announcements relate to corporate taxation are culled out from Union Budget 
documents of India.  
 
Table 1 reveals that the business firms with profits before taxes (PBT) above Rs 500 crores 
contribute to 60.63 per cent of corporate tax revenue. However, it is also evident that the effective 
tax rate is only 22.88 per cent for these gigantic business firms (with PBT greater than 500 crore), 
as compared to 29.37 per cent effective tax borne by the companies with profit before tax up to 
one crore. Any tax reforms in corporate sector will therefore have redistributive effect on small 
firms. 
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Table 1: Effective Tax Rates of Corporate Sector in India, 2015 
Sl. 
No. 
Profit Before Taxes Share in Profits 
before taxes 
(in %) 
Share in 
Total 
Income 
(in %) 
Share in 
Total 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
Liability 
( %) 
Ratio of 
Total Income 
to Profits 
Before Taxes 
(in %) 
Effective Tax 
Rate (in %) 
(Profit to Tax 
Ratio) 
1 Less than Zero 0 0.58 0.47   
2 Zero 0 6.54 2.81   
3 0-1 Crore 2.73 3.38 3.25 95.39 29.37 
4 1-10 Crore 6.76 7.54 7.4 85.44 26.99 
5 10-50 Crore 9.17 9.08 9.48 76.26 25.52 
6 50-100 Crore 5.16 5.01 5.26 74.83 25.14 
7 100-500 Crore 15.55 14.56 15.12 72.00 23.97 
8 Greater than ` 500 Crore 60.63 53.31 56.21 67.66 22.88 
9 All Companies 100 100 100 76.94 24.67 
Note: 1 crore (or 100 lakhs) is equivalent to 10 million 
Source: Budget Document 2016-17, Ministry of Finance, Budget Division, Government of India 
 
A tax reform in corporate sector to rationalize the tax structure without tax exemptions would also 
mean effective tax rate going up for those paying lower than the intended statutory rate 
(Chakraborty and Chakraborty, 2016). The statutory tax rate for corporate sector is as high as 35 
per cent. The budgetary announcement in Union Budget of India 2018-19 is a right step in policy 
direction to reduce the corporate tax rate to 25 per cent only for those firms with turnover up to Rs 
250 crores.  
 
4. The Model Specification and Stylized Facts.  
The model specification for impact of corporate taxation (c) on both capital (k) and labor (l) is as 
follows. 
𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑐𝑖𝑡
′ + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑐𝑖𝑡
′ + 𝑢𝑖𝑡   
 
These two regression equations are now treated as separate equations and give the efficiency 
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effects of corporate taxation, incorporating the control variables. The dynamic relationship is 
characterized by the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors. The 
coefficients from these equations explain the efficiency effects of an increase in the corporate tax 
on capital and labor. The most important independent variable is the effective corporate tax (cit)of 
the firms. The effective corporate tax to which the firms are subjected is the computed as corporate 
taxes paid divided by the profit before tax (PBT), which is available directly from the database. A 
point to be noted here is that a heterogeneity is intrinsic to the observed average tax rate, as it is a 
function of both statutory corporate tax rates and firm responses to the tax system and its 
incentives. The lack of variations in statutory corporate tax variable over the years, in single-
country research design studies of incidence, is a concern among researchers. One way is to 
incorporate “tax reforms” to bring in variations. However, in Indian context, there is no high 
frequency reforms in corporate taxation. The corporate taxes in India also does not vary across 
subnational governments. Yet another way to bring in heterogeneity is to incorporate the firm’s 
behavioral variables. We have opted in our models, the second option. Prima facie, the relationship 
between capital and labour with corporate tax should be negative. With the imposition of the 
corporate tax, the capital formation in the business firms decrease, which further affects the 
marginal product of labor and hence lower wages. However, following Desai, Foley, and Hines 
(2007), the independent variables used in our models are log forms of “one minus effective 
corporate tax”. Hence, the expected signs of the coefficients of all three proxies for capital and 
labour should be positive. In the models, ln(1-c) captures the coefficient of incidence of corporate 
tax (c) on capital and [(1-s)/s)* ln(1-c)] captures the effect of corporate tax incidence on labour, 
where s is the labor share of output defined as wL/Q, calculated by dividing the compensation to 
employees (wL) by the total income of the firms (Q). 
 
 Three proxies are used for the capital variable (K), namely, return on equity (ROE), return on debt 
(ROD), and gross fixed assets (GFA). ROE is the rate of return received by the shareholders from 
the profits of the firm after taxes have been paid. It is computed as the ratio of profit after tax to 
the average net worth, with both values in millions. ROD is the interest rate paid to the debt holders 
by the firm and is calculated by dividing interest paid by the sum of the long-term and short-term 
borrowing of the firms, with all figures in millions. The data for long-term and short-term 
borrowing was available only from 2011–15, therefore the analysis for this indicator is restricted. 
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The GFA of the firm were directly available and are measured in millions. The GFA model is to 
analyse whether corporate tax has negative effects on capital formation of the firms. The variable 
used for proxy the labour is the wages paid by the firms. The “compensation to employees” is 
available in CMIE dataset. All variables are used in the natural log in the regression models. The 
heterogeneous firm specific cost variables for infrastructure (INFRA) - power, fuel and water - and 
raw materials (RW) are also added in the models.  
 
The firm specific cost variables relate to infrastructure - power, fuel, and water charges - incurred 
by the firms, and the raw materials costs are also available from CMIE dataset. Moreover, only 
supply-side variables in wage determination model are used rather than demand-side variables. 
For instance, demand side variables like professional skills and education status are not included 
as explanatory variables in the wage determination analysis, though it is known to have significant 
impacts. The unit of analysis of our wage determination model is firm level, not individuals, and 
therefore the demand side variables are not included for the complications with data consistency.  
 
5. Econometric Modeling 
Our paper analyzes the influence of corporate tax on capital and labour, integrating the firm-
specific variables on the corporate firms’ behaviour.  To estimate the effect of corporate taxes on 
capital and labor, we use the one-step generalized method of moments (GMM) by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) for the estimation of dynamic panel datasets. We have large cross-sectional and small 
time-series units, corrected for endogeneity issues.  
 
We consider the equation: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ + 𝑢𝑖𝑡where i=1…N and t=1….T.  
where 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡, where 𝜇𝑖𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) and  𝜗𝑖𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎𝜗
2) are independent of each other. 
The inclusion of the lagged independent variable renders the OLS estimates biased and 
inconsistent, even if the 𝜗𝑖𝑡 are not serially correlated. This is due to the correlation between the 
lagged dependent variable and the error term. In case of the fixed effects estimator, the within 
transformation wipes out 𝜇𝑖𝑡 but 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is still correlated with 𝜗?̅? by construction. Hence the fixed 
9 
 
effects estimator will be biased and consistent only when → ∞ . Therefore, when N is large and T 
fixed, the within estimator is biased and inconsistent. The random effects estimator will also be 
biased in a dynamic panel data model.  A first difference transformation of the model was 
suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1981). This first differencing was used to get rid of 𝜇𝑖 and then 
the instrumental variable (IV) estimation procedure would be used; however, the above method 
leads to consistent but inefficient estimates of the parameters.  
 
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed a GMM procedure that is more efficient than the Anderson 
and Hsiao (1982) estimator. The methodology used by Arellano and Bond (1991) argued that 
additional instruments can be obtained if the orthogonality conditions between the lagged values 
of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 and the disturbances 𝜗𝑖𝑡 are used. Our methodology can be illustrated with the help of a 
simple autoregressive model with no regressors, as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡Where i=1…N, t=1….T, and uit = μit + ϑit, with μit~IID(0, σu
2) and  
ϑit~IID(0, σϑ
2) independent of each other and among themselves.  
 
In order to get consistent estimates, the individual effects are first eliminated by first differencing 
the equation to obtain:  
yit − yi,t−1 = δ(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2) + (ϑit − ϑi,t−1) 
When t=3, we have:  
yi3 − yi2 = δ(yi2 − yi1) + (ϑi3 − ϑi2) 
In this case, yi1 is a valid instrument, since it is highly correlated with (yi2 − yi1) and not correlated 
with (ϑi3 − ϑi2) as long as ϑit are not serially correlated. For t=4, 
yi4 − yi3 = δ(yi3 − yi2) + (ϑi4 − ϑi3) 
 
In this case, yi2 as well as yi1 are valid instruments for (yi3 − yi2), since both yi2 and yi1 are not 
correlated with (ϑi4 − ϑi3). Adding valid instruments in this fashion for period T, the set of valid 
instruments becomes (yi1, yi2 … … . yi,T−2 ). Let w be the matrix of all instruments of individual i, 
so pre-multiplying the difference equation in the vector form with the matrix of all instruments 
10 
 
gives: 
W′∆y =  W′(∆y−1)δ +  W′∆ϑ 
Now, if we perform generalized least squares on this model, we will get the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) one-step consistent GMM estimator. 
 
The dynamic effects of corporate tax on capital and labour are given in Tables 2 and 3. The effects 
of business taxation on capital is found to be higher than that on labour. The econometric estimates 
show that an increase in the corporate tax by 1 percent will lead to a fall in the GFA by 0.0534 
percent. Similarly, an increase in the corporate tax will result in a decrease in the return on equity 
by 0.6027 percent. The impact of corporate tax on interest paid on debt is insignificant. 
Table 2. Dynamic effects of corporate taxation on capital. 
Dependent 
Variable/ 
Independent 
Variable 
Constant Lagged 
Dependent 
Variable 
ln 
(1-c) 
ln (W) ln 
(INFRA) 
ln 
(RW) 
Obs. 
ln(GFA) 1.1201    
(0.0393) 
0.7591*   
(0.0095) 
0.0534*   
(0.0117) 
0.0421*   
(0.0082) 
0.0484*   
(0.0054) 
0.0301*   
(0.0038) 
30665 
ln(ROE) -1.683  
(0.0864) 
0.2696*   
(0.0146) 
0.6207*   
(0.0427) 
-0.2192*   
(0.0235) 
-0.0043*   
(0.0209) 
0.1787*   
(0.0152) 
19471 
ln(ROD) -3.1747   
(0.2391) 
0.2942*  
(0.0435) 
0.0129   
(0.0572) 
0.2075* 
(0.0488) 
0.1005*   
(0.0346) 
0.0266   
(0.024) 
5121 
Note: * significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and *** significant 
at the 10 percent level.  
Source: (Basic data), CMIE PROWESS data 
The coefficients of corporate tax in the labour models are relatively of less magnitude than capital 
models. The increase of 1 per cent in corporate tax would lead to decline in wages to the extent of 
only around 0.002 to 0.005 per cent (Table 3). 
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Table 3. Dynamic effects of corporate taxation on labour. 
Dependent 
Variable/ 
Independent 
Variable 
Constant Lagged 
dep 
variable 
((1-
s)/s)* 
ln(1-c) 
ln(GFA) ln(ROE) ln(ROD) ln(INFRA) ln(RW) Obs. 
ln(L) -0.0141  
(0.0270) 
0.7566*   
(0.0094) 
0.0017* 
(0.0001) 
 0.0305* 
(0.0026) 
 0.1869* 
(0.0063) 
0.0926* 
(0.0046) 
21897 
ln(L) -0.2237  
(0.028) 
0.6376*   
(0.0085) 
0.0015* 
(0.0001) 
0.0573* 
(0.0075) 
  0.2186* 
(0.0051) 
0.1130* 
(0.0036) 
30585 
ln(L) -0.4591 
(0.1296) 
0.621*   
(0.0283) 
0.0005* 
(0.0002) 
  0.0053  
(0.0052) 
0.1945* 
(0.0109) 
0.0986* 
(0.0076) 
5291 
Note: * significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and *** significant 
at the 10 percent level.  
Source: (Basic data), CMIE PROWESS data 
The lack of significant impact of corporate tax on labour needs to be interpreted with caution, in 
the context of India. Apriori in case with perfect mobility of labour, corporate taxation should not 
affect labour.  But the mobility differentials across various labour categories is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  The migration decisions may depend on wage determination as well as public service 
provisioning (“voting with feet” to better jurisdictions). An analysis of disaggregating these effects 
can be a future research. Fuest et al (2017) highlights that gigantic and in particular foreign-owned 
firms can avoid taxes by shifting profits across jurisdictions or even abroad and if this is relevant, 
one should observe smaller effects of corporate tax changes for these firms on wages.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Using the dynamic panel models, this paper estimates the corporate income tax incidence in India. 
The econometric estimates suggest that capital bears relatively more burden of corporate tax than 
labour. The effective taxation rate of corporate sector of small firms in India is found to be 
relatively higher than that of gigantic firms. However, the channels of business taxation on wage 
determination are found relatively weaker in India. The lack of pass-through of business tax effects 
on labour can also depend on wage determination mechanisms, though an analysis of these 
collective bargaining models are beyond the scope of our present paper. The lack of significant 
link between corporate taxation and wages may also due to profit shifting arrangements. However, 
this demands further research whether the incidence of corporate taxes on wages is lesser due to 
income shifting to avoid taxes. 
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